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Zimbabwe

Comparative National Systems



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Introduction

This report considers the comparative politics of Zimbabwe using the SPECIPIO framework for comparative political analysis.¹

The state of Zimbabwe emerged out of the former British colony of Southern Rhodesia, gaining independence in 1980. Robert Mugabe, a prominent leader in the Zimbabwean independence movement, was elected the first Prime Minister in 1980 and has remained in power ever since. Initially hailed as a model for post-colonial governance, Mugabe promoted reconciliation with the white population and sought to empower the long oppressed black population. Through the 1980's, he presided over economic growth and relative political stability. However, Mugabe and his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), also consolidated power and used violence and electoral manipulation to remain in office. The Mugabe regime's mismanagement of the economy precipitated a staggering collapse of the Zimbabwean economy since 2000, leaving the country impoverished and destitute.

The state of governance in Zimbabwe is currently in flux as a result of the disputed presidential election in 2008. In the first round of the presidential election, Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Party, defeated President Mugabe; however, ZANU-PF² officials contended that Tsvangirai failed to win a majority of the vote and demanded a runoff election. In the lead-up to the run-off election, government security

forces perpetrated widespread violence against MDC supporters leading Tsvangirai to withdraw from the race. In September 2008, ZANU-PF and MDC negotiated a power-sharing agreement, and in February 2009, they formed a new “unity” government. The negotiations nonetheless persist as Tsvangirai and the MDC accuse Mugabe and the ZANU-PF of failing to comply with the terms of the agreement.

Since independence, Robert Mugabe has dominated the political landscape in Zimbabwe through 29 years of autocratic rule. Yet Mugabe’s power is also closely tied to that of the military as a consequence of the ZANU-PF’s legacy as an armed liberation movement. In fact, evidence suggests that in the midst of electoral crisis of 2008, the military essentially seized control from Mugabe.³ While the unity government may mark the beginning of a transition to democratic governance, it remains to be seen whether Mugabe and the military leadership of the ZANU-PF will legitimately engage in this process.

Stateness

Zimbabwe is a land-locked state located in Southern Africa surrounded by Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, and South Africa. The state is relatively small with a population of approximately 11.4 million and occupying 150,872 square miles, an area just larger than Montana. The largest ethnic groups are the Shona and Ndebele, which comprise 82% and 14% of the population respectively.⁴ The Ndebele population is concentrated largely in the Matabeleland region in western Zimbabwe. The white population, which reflects the Zimbabwe’s status as post-colonial state, numbered around 200,000 at the time of independence but has sharply declined from emigration since 2000.

In recent years, Zimbabwe has descended towards failed state status due to the economic collapse and the government's inability to provide key services to its citizens. Indeed, *Foreign Policy* magazine ranked Zimbabwe second behind only Somalia on its 2009 index of "Failed States."⁵ Though the economy has stabilized in 2009, in 2008 Zimbabwe faced a failing economy. Hyperinflation had rendered the Zimbabwean dollar worthless and crippled the markets for goods and services. As a result of food shortages, Zimbabwe became the most food aid dependent country in the world, with between 65-80% of the population relying on food aid.⁶ The government could not pay public employees a meaningful wage or finance public projects. With no incentive for employees to report to work, schools closed, hospitals cut services, and public infrastructure crumbled.⁷ The cholera outbreak that began in August 2008 and has killed over 4,000 people has spotlighted the government's inability to provide adequate health facilities and services.⁸

However, while the Zimbabwean government is ineffective in managing the economy and providing basic services to its citizens, it does maintain strong control over its territory and is able to implement policies. In this sense, Zimbabwe is actually a relatively strong state under the Max Weber definition of a state as "claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a given territory."⁹ The Zimbabwe security apparatus, under the purview of the military, maintains strict control over the citizenry, as it revealed in its campaign of violence to repress MDC opposition during the elections of 2008. The ZANU-PF has also demonstrated its ability to implement large-scale policies such as the land reforms in 2000 or Operation "Urban Renewal" in 2005 to forcibly move urban poor populations into rural areas.

Political Regime

Though structured as a liberal democracy at its inception, Zimbabwe quickly evolved to a competitive authoritarian regime. Zimbabwe holds elections and has democratic institutions, yet the elections are fraudulent, and ZANU-PF uses violence and intimidation to influence the results. An opposition party, the MDC, does exist, and it has achieved electoral successes, notably the defeat of the constitutional referendum in 2000 and capturing a majority of seats in the House of Assembly in 2008. Nonetheless, the ZANU-PF has maintained a firm grip on power since independence, and it has ultimately suppressed any movement that threatens to uproot its dominance. The ZANU-PF allows elections and limited opposition in order to suggest legitimacy, but it refuses to be ousted by popular election as it showed in manipulating the 2002 and 2008 presidential elections.¹⁰

In its 2009 index of “Freedom in the World,” Freedom House classifies Zimbabwe as “not free” with a score of 7 out of 7 for political rights (a 7 representing the lowest level of freedom) and a 6 out of 7 for civil liberties. Freedom of expression is severely limited and opposition groups are subject to violent reprisals by government security forces. The state controls the media, preventing freedom of the press, and restricts access of foreign journalists. The judiciary, which unsuccessfully attempted to block Mugabe’s land reform program in 2000, is not independent from ZANU-PF influence, and the legal system fails to assure basic rights for defendants. Not only does the state fail to protect property rights, but it has also violated these rights through land seizures and forced evictions.¹¹

Zimbabwe’s brand of authoritarianism is personalistic, as the state has known no ruler but Robert Mugabe since its inception. Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe as Prime Minister from 1980-

1987, and President from 1987 to the present. Mugabe was originally elected in 1980 under free and fair elections, but once in office he centralized power and established a one party system after dismantling the rival ZAPU party in a state-sponsored massacre of its Ndebele constituents in the Matabeleland region from 1982-1987. He has enacted 18 amendments to the Constitution to fit his political desires¹² and has defeated opposition presidential candidates such as Edgar Tekere and Morgan Tsvangirai through violence and fraudulent arrests and trails.¹³ For 29 years Mugabe has shrewdly prevented any opponent from wresting power from his control.

However, the authoritarian regime in Zimbabwe appears now to be transitioning to military control. As the ZANU political party formed out of an armed liberation movement, the military has always played a strong role in the ZANU party and is central to its identity. Since 2000, the military has assumed a particularly prominent in using violence to influence elections. The Joint Operations Command (JOC), a collection of the heads of the military, police, and intelligence branches, has grown increasingly powerful as it coordinates responses to all national security threats including any domestic disturbances. Most significantly though, in March 2008, after losing the first round of the presidential election, Mugabe reportedly indicated a desire to relinquish power to Morgan Tsvangirai. The military interceded and demanded that Mugabe remain in office.¹⁴ The JOC then initiated the campaign of violence against MDC supporters (known as Operation Mavhoterapapi or “how did you vote?”) that forced Tsvangirai to withdraw from the race. Thus, while Mugabe remains President, the military now appears to have ultimate authority and will determine succession.

Economic Development

Zimbabwe's fertile farmlands and abundant natural resources spurred the development of agriculture and mining industries under British colonial rule. Agriculture serves not only as a means of domestic food production, but also as a source of exports, and the mining industry utilizes Zimbabwe's gold and platinum reserves, the largest stores of coal in Africa, and recently discovered diamonds.¹⁵ At the time of independence, Zimbabwe enjoyed robust agriculture, mining, and manufacturing industries and sound infrastructure. The new government promoted further economic development by implementing measures to provide universal education and health services and invest in peasant farming.¹⁶ Though agriculture production fluctuated based on weather patterns, the Zimbabwean economy was relatively stable throughout the 1980's, with an overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate over 5% for the decade.¹⁷ However, government mismanagement of the economy, corruption, and patronage began to hinder economic growth.

Zimbabwe's economic collapse began in 2000 when Mugabe instituted a land reform program to seize white-owned farms and transfer the land to the black population. The program decimated the commercial agriculture industry, which had been a key source of employment, exports, and domestic food supply. As a result of the land redistribution, agricultural production in Zimbabwe decreased by 79% from 2002-2008, an estimated 200,000 farm employees lost their jobs, and 80% of the population now relies on food aid.¹⁸ The overall GDP has contracted by around 40% from 1999-2008.¹⁹ This collapse of agricultural sector was compounded by untenable fiscal policy that included deficit spending to finance the military incursion in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998-2002 and payments to veterans from the war of

independence. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe printed money to cover the deficits, resulting in hyperinflation.

By 2008, the economy was in a severe crisis. The GDP decreased by 14% in 2008,²⁰ unemployment was estimated at 80%,²¹ and hyperinflation grew out of control. The inflation rate reached 89.7 sextillion percent annually, or 98 percent daily, in November 2008 before it became impossible to calculate.²² The population experienced shortages of basic goods including food, and diminished utility services such as electricity and water.²³

The economy has stabilized in 2009. The government mitigated the hyperinflation crisis by eliminating the Zimbabwean dollar and allowing the use of foreign currencies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that Zimbabwe will achieve 3% GDP growth in 2009.²⁴ Nonetheless, the economic forecast is still bleak as Zimbabwe has a long way to go to restore its industries and infrastructure, reform its fiscal policy, and establish a viable currency.

The economic collapse in Zimbabwe has weakened the legitimacy and credibility of the Mugabe regime and bolstered support for the MDC. The economic crisis fostered discontent and enabled the MDC's successes in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the economic crisis coupled with the state-sponsored violence during the elections garnered international condemnation and pressure for a negotiated power-sharing agreement. However, despite providing the impetus for reform, the low level of economic development also suggests that, if created, a true democratic government may be difficult to sustain.²⁵

Culture and History

The legacy of British colonization and white rule is apparent in the ideology and policies of Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF. Rhodesia, which comprised what is now Zimbabwe and

Zambia, was founded in the late 1800's under the administration of the British South Africa Company, and in 1923 Southern Rhodesia (what is now Zimbabwe) was annexed as a colony of Great Britain. Though Britain retained final authority over the colony, Southern Rhodesia was largely self-governed by the white minority. In 1965, Southern Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The Southern Rhodesian government, led by Prime Minister Ian Smith, was fiercely committed to maintaining white rule, but Britain refused to recognize Rhodesian independence without provisions for majority rule.

From 1974-1979, African nationalist groups including Robert Mugabe's ZANU and Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU allied under a Patriotic Front and waged a guerrilla war against the Southern Rhodesia government. In 1980, Zimbabwe won its independence in the Lancaster House Agreement following negotiations between the Patriotic Front, the Southern Rhodesia government, and Britain.

Mugabe initially promoted reconciliation with Zimbabwe's white population, allowing whites to keep their property and serve in his government. However, this model for an inclusive, democratic government conflicted with the goals and structure of Mugabe's ZANU party, an organization that never fully transitioned from an armed resistance movement to a political party.²⁶ The ZANU party views its mission to protect Zimbabwe from its white colonial oppressors and reasons that ZANU's role in the independence movement entitles it to permanent rule of Zimbabwe. Accordingly, Mugabe and the ZANU-PF eventually pushed the whites out of government, seized their land, and justify their oppression on the basis of a continued struggle against white rule. Ironically, the regime that Mugabe has established strongly resembles that of

his predecessor, Ian Smith, an out-of-touch autocrat who kept Mugabe in jail for 11 years in order to stifle his political opposition.²⁷

Institutions

Ostensibly, Zimbabwe has democratic institutions: a constitution, multiple political parties, executive, judiciary, and legislative branches. However, Mugabe and the ZANU-PF generally overwhelm and manipulate these institutions.

The Zimbabwe Constitution was written during the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979, though it has now been amended 18 times, often at the whim of Mugabe and the ZANU-PF. The new unity government is currently working to write a new constitution.

The Parliament of Zimbabwe is bicameral with a House of Assembly and Senate. The House of Assembly contains 210 seats and members are elected in single member districts using the First Past the Post (FPTP) system requiring a plurality of votes. The Senate contains 93 seats, of which 60 are popularly elected using the Block Vote system with 6 Senators elected from each of the 10 provinces. Of the remaining 33 Senate seats, 10 provincial governors are nominated by the president, 16 traditional chiefs are elected by the Council of Chiefs, 2 are held by the president and deputy president of the Council of Chiefs, and 5 are appointed by the president.²⁸ Members of the House of Assembly and Senate serve 5-year terms with elections held concurrently. The House of Assembly has existed since independence in 1980, while the Senate was eliminated in 1989 and then reinstated in 2005 in its current form.

Following the 2008 parliamentary elections, the MDC holds 109 seats in the House of Assembly, the ZANU-PF holds 97, and other parties hold 4. The 60 popularly elected seats in the Senate are split 30 and 30 between the MDC and ZANU-PF.²⁹

The Judicial branch includes a Supreme Court, High Court, and a series of regional courts. The legitimacy of the court system has suffered since 2000, when the courts' rulings against the land redistribution program prompted the ire of the Mugabe administration. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF used violence and intimidation to press justices to leave office. The judiciary has since been filled with ZANU-PF loyalists and is not independent from the executive branch.³⁰

The executive branch includes the President, who serves as Chief of State, the Prime Minister, who is Head of Government, and a cabinet appointed by the President (and responsible to the House of Assembly). The President may also appoint 2 Vice-Presidents. The position of Prime Minister was eliminated in 1987 to create the Presidency, but it was reinstated in 2009 as part of the power sharing agreement. The President was elected every six years (though the term limit was reduced to 5 years in a 2007 Constitutional Amendment) in a two-round system requiring a majority of votes.

Following the disputed Presidential elections in 2008, the ZANU-PF and the MDC reached a power-sharing agreement in September 2008 called the Global Political Agreement. In February 2009, the parties formed a unity government in which Robert Mugabe is the President, and Morgan Tsvangirai is the Prime Minister, and Arthur Matambara, the leader of an MDC faction, is the Deputy Prime Minister. The Cabinet is divided among the rival parties with Mugabe's ZANU-PF holding 15 posts, and the two MDC factions holding a combined 16 posts.³¹ In October 2009, Tsvangirai and his party withdrew from participation in the unity government after citing Mugabe's ZANU-PF as "a dishonest and unreliable partner."³² On

November 5, 2009, Tsvangirai announced that the MDC end its boycott of the unity government,³³ and at this writing they are still participating in the new government.

Party Families

The dominant political party in Zimbabwe is the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), which is an amalgamation of the ZANU and ZAPU parties led by Robert Mugabe. Both parties emerged as African nationalist organizations during the struggle for independence, with ZANU forming in 1962 as an offshoot of ZAPU. In 1974, the two organizations allied under the Patriotic Front to fight against the government of Southern Rhodesia. ZAPU was led by Joshua Nkomo and represented the Ndebele ethnicity, while ZANU was led by Mugabe (since 1977) and was ethnically Shona. Following independence, Nkomo served in Mugabe's cabinet, but Mugabe distrusted his political rival. In 1982, after discovering arms stockpiles associated with ZAPU dissidents, ZANU undertook "Operation Gukuruhundi," a campaign of violence against the Ndebele people in the Matabeleland region in which an estimated 20,000 civilians were killed.³⁴ The violence persisted until 1987, when Mugabe and Nkomo signed the Unity Accord to end the conflict, and ZAPU joined the ZANU party to form ZANU-PF.

The ZANU-PF party is at its core a national liberation movement. The party's ideology is a reflection of its origins as an armed resistance movement against its white colonial oppressors, and ZANU-PF uses its role in the independence movement to justify its authoritarian rule. The party frames its existence in the context of permanent armed struggle and seeks to associate opposition with the return of colonial rule.³⁵ ZANU-PF is unabashedly committed to maintaining control of the state, and the 1987 Unity Accords even explicitly declare that "We

[the ZANU-PF] shall seek to establish a one-party state.”³⁶ The military plays a strong role in the party and the war veterans are its most important and revered demographic. Though Mugabe often characterizes his regime as a Marxist movement, his policies have not closely followed that ideology, beyond the centralization of power.

The MDC party formed in 1999 as an opposition movement and consists of a consortium of trade unions and civil society organizations united by their disenchantment with the Mugabe regime. Morgan Tsvangirai leads the party. The formation of the MDC in 1999 reflected the growing discontent in the 1990’s with the economic decline and the increasingly corrupt, ineffective, and repressive government. The party ideology revolves around its opposition to the Mugabe regime, and it professes to seek a democratic transition and free society in Zimbabwe.³⁷ The MDC successfully mobilized opposition to defeat Mugabe’s Constitutional referendum in 2000 and has won significant numbers of seats in the parliament in the 2002, 2005, and 2008 elections. Tsvangirai challenged Mugabe in the 2002 and 2008 presidential elections, but he was ultimately defeated in both cases as a result of violence against MDC supporters and election fraud. The party split in 2005, and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Matambara leads a faction rivaling that of Tsvangirai.

International Influences

South Africa, which is Zimbabwe’s biggest trading partner and maintains a close relationship with Zimbabwe stemming from their shared history of struggle against white rule, has the potential to exert strong, effective influence on Zimbabwe. Yet South Africa did not use its influence to discourage Mugabe’s disastrous land reform program in 2000, and in recent years President Thabo Mbeki pursued a “Quiet Diplomacy” strategy that achieved little progress in

coaxing Mugabe to reform his repressive, authoritarian style of governance. Mbeki did, however, lead negotiations beginning in 2007 between the ZANU-PF and the MDC to bring about the 2008 presidential election, and he brokered the power-sharing agreement in 2008 following the disputed elections. The South African Development Community (SADC), an inter-governmental institution consisting of 15 states in Southern Africa, has also played a strong role in backing these negotiations and pressuring Mugabe to embrace reform. Since taking office in May 2009, South African President Jacob Zuma has assumed a stronger stance in condemning the Mugabe regime than his predecessor, but he similarly advocates for reform through the framework of the power-sharing government.³⁸ Mugabe has criticized South African encroachments, noting that Zimbabwe actively opposed the apartheid regime in South Africa and assisted the African National Congress during its struggle against independence.

Zimbabwe has close ties to Britain as result of the colonial history, but the relationship has suffered over disputes regarding Britain's responsibility to finance land redistribution. Mugabe contends that Britain has failed to provide financial assistance for land reform as agreed to in the Lancaster House negotiations.³⁹ As previously discussed, Mugabe and the ZANU-PF derive domestic political support from their opposition to white rule, and British condemnation or pressure can actually serve to bolster domestic support for the regime.

Since 2003, the United States and European Union have imposed financial and travel sanctions on Zimbabwe, and the IMF suspended assistance from 1999-2009. The IMF resumed assistance in the beginning of 2009 with the new government, and the U.S and E.U. have offered the incentive of lifting the sanctions if the Mugabe regime participates in good faith in the power

sharing agreement. However, these international punishments and inducement appear to have little influence on Mugabe's policies and behavior.

Ownership

British colonialism and the Southern Rhodesian government created a large disparity in land distribution between whites and blacks. At the time of independence, a small white minority controlled the majority of the fertile land in Zimbabwe and the commercial farming resources. The Lancaster House Agreement included a provision prohibiting the seizure of white-owned land for the first ten years after independence. It did, however, allow the voluntary sale of land to the government under market prices, and Great Britain pledged £44 million for the purchase of lands. During those 10 years, the government only purchased 40% of the 8 million hectares it targeted for redistribution. After the 10-year provision from the Lancaster House Agreement expired, Mugabe amended the constitution to allow compulsory seizures of white-owned land. Nonetheless, land seizures and redistribution progressed slowly throughout the 1990's. Mugabe's government spent the £44 million from the British by 1988, and in 1997 the British refused Mugabe's demands to provide further funding.⁴⁰

In 2000, Mugabe announced a Fast Track plan to acquire and redistribute the remaining 4,500 white-owned commercial farms in Zimbabwe. The plan was designed to distribute the majority of acquired land in parcels to poor, landless blacks for non-commercial agriculture use and the rest for commercial farming operations. By 2009, only 400 white commercial farms remain, but the redistribution has been ineffective as many of the farms are now idle, production has diminished, and infrastructure has been neglected.⁴¹ Furthermore, as a consequence of

corruption and inept management, the government has failed to widely distribute land among poor, black farmers as it intended.⁴²

Ownership of Zimbabwe's assets resides largely with the ZANU-PF party and its loyalists. While the white population once held a disproportionately high share of the country's resources, the land redistribution stripped white farmers of their land and caused much of the remaining population to flee the country. Elites within the government, military, and ZANU-PF party have accumulated much of the country's wealth and assets through abuse of authority and corruption. These public officials have reaped financial benefits from the mining industry, the plunder associated with the military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the myriad businesses with direct connections to the state and the ZANU-PF party.⁴³ Veterans from the war for independence have also benefitted from the government largesse, receiving payments, pensions, and land in order to win their support for the regime. The majority of the population though remains impoverished, without assets or influence.

Conclusions

Robert Mugabe cannot rule Zimbabwe forever. The current desperate state of the economy, the public discontent with the Mugabe regime, the existence of democratic institutions and an established opposition party, and international pressure from South Africa and the SADC, collectively create an atmosphere favorable to democratic reform. However, the ZANU-PF is a powerful and entrenched opponent of any such reform, and the military now appears to control the succession of power. Though the power-sharing government may represent the beginning of a democratic transition, it may also represent wishful thinking on the part of the international community. A true power-sharing or unity government runs counter to the ZANU-PF

ideological commitment to one-party, authoritarian rule, and Mugabe and the ZANU-PF have offered little indication that they are willing to relinquish their complete authority over the state. Thus, the case may be that democracy will not flourish in Zimbabwe until the ZANU-PF, in its current form, is removed from power.

¹ This SPECIPIO framework evaluates a state on the basis of 8 factors: Stateness, Political Regime, Economic Development, Culture and History, Institutions, Party Families, International Influences, and Ownership.

² In 1987, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) merged with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) to form the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).

³ Michael Brattor and Eldred Masunungure. "Zimbabwe's Long Agony." *Journal of Democracy*. October 2008: Vol. 19, Num. 4. P.49-50.

⁴ "Zimbabwe." *CIA World Factbook*. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html>

⁵ "The Failed States Index, 2009." *Foreign Policy*. June 22, 2009.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index

To calculate its Failed State index, *Foreign Policy* evaluates states using 12 criteria: Demographic Pressures, Refugees/IDPs, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven Development, Economic Decline, Deligitimation of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention.

⁶ Stuart Dornan, "Zimbabwe's Economy: A Report Card, Mid-2009". *The Brenthurst Foundation*. October 2009.

http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commissioned_Reports/BD0908-Zimbabwe.pdf

⁷ Celia Dugger. "Life in Zimbabwe—Wait for Useless Money." *New York Times*. October 1, 2008.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/world/africa/02zimbabwe.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1

⁸ "Cholera in Zimbabwe—Update 4." *World Health Organization*. June 9, 2009.

http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_06_09/en/index.html

⁹ As Robert Rotberg notes in his critique of the *Foreign Policy* Failed State index, "Zimbabwe is the second-most failed state, just ahead of Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Yet Zimbabwe has no discernible civil warfare. Its government does prey harshly on any opposition, but the Zimbabwean state has not lost its monopoly control of violence and should therefore not be considered failed."

Robert Rotberg. "Disorder in the Ranks: A Different Take on Just What Makes a Failed State." *Foreign Policy*. June 22, 2009. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_disorder_in_the_ranks

¹⁰ As Michael Brattor and Eldred Masunungure observe in their 2008 study on the ZANU-PF, "As in any electoral-authoritarian regime, competitive elections in Zimbabwe serve the useful purpose of demonstrating the incumbent's dominance, but only so long as the opposition can never win. Over time, it has become clear that the ZANU-PF cadres will never recognize an opposition victory at the polls or surrender control of the government that they regard as belonging indisputably to themselves alone."

Michael Brattor and Eldred Masunungure. "Zimbabwe's Long Agony." *Journal of Democracy*. October 2008: Vol. 19, Num. 4. p.43.

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- ¹¹ “Freedom in the World—Zimbabwe.” *Freedom House*. 2009 Edition. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009>
- ¹² “Freedom in the World—Zimbabwe.” *Freedom House*. 2009 Edition. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009>
- ¹³ Michael Brattor and Eldred Masunungure. “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony.” *Journal of Democracy*. October 2008: Vol. 19, Num. 4. p.44.
- ¹⁴ Michael Brattor and Eldred Masunungure. “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony.” *Journal of Democracy*. October 2008: Vol. 19, Num. 4. p.49-50.
- ¹⁵ Stuart Dornan, “Zimbabwe’s Economy: A Report Card, Mid-2009”. *The Brenthurst Foundation*. October 2009. http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commissioned_Reports/BD0908-Zimbabwe.pdf
- ¹⁶ Michael Brattor and Eldred Masunungure. “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony.” *Journal of Democracy*. October 2008: Vol. 19, Num. 4. p.46.
- ¹⁷ Craig Richardson, “The Loss of Property Rights and the Collapse of Zimbabwe.” *Cato Journal*. Vol. 25, No. 3. Fall 2005. p.541.
- ¹⁸ Stuart Dornan, “Zimbabwe’s Economy: A Report Card, Mid-2009”. *The Brenthurst Foundation*. October 2009. http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commissioned_Reports/BD0908-Zimbabwe.pdf
- ¹⁹ “Zimbabwe: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Zimbabwe.” *International Monetary Fund*. May 2009. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09139.pdf>
- ²⁰ Stuart Dornan, “Zimbabwe’s Economy: A Report Card, Mid-2009”. *The Brenthurst Foundation*. October 2009. http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commissioned_Reports/BD0908-Zimbabwe.pdf
- ²¹ “Freedom in the World—Zimbabwe.” *Freedom House*. 2009 Edition. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009>
- ²² Sebastian Berger. “Zimbabwe Dollar Dead, Says Top Economist.” *The Daily Telegraph*. February 10, 2009. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/4580364/Zimbabwe-dollar-dead-says-top-economist.html>
- ²³ “Freedom in the World—Zimbabwe.” *Freedom House*. 2009 Edition. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009>
- ²⁴ “IMF Says Zimbabwe GDP to grow 3 Percent in 2009.” *Reuters*. October 29, 2009. <http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE59S0CS20091029>
- ²⁵ Przeworski et al., “What Makes Democracies Endure?” *Journal of Democracy*. 2006. Przeworski et al. argue that democracies with low levels of economic development are susceptible to slipping back to authoritarian government (but that once the democracy crosses a threshold of development, a GDP of \$6055, the democracy is secure).
- ²⁶ Michael Brattor and Eldred Masunungure. “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony.” *Journal of Democracy*. October 2008: Vol. 19, Num. 4. p.46.
- ²⁷ Heidi Holland discusses the similarities between the regimes of Robert Mugabe and Ian Smith in her book, *Dinner with Mugabe: The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter Who Became a Tyrant*. (Penguin Books: South Africa, 2008). p. 82-93.
- ²⁸ “Zimbabwe.” *CIA World Factbook* <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html>
- ²⁹ “Zimbabwe.” *CIA World Factbook* <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html>
- ³⁰ “‘Our Hands are Tied’: Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe.” *Human Rights Watch*. (Human Rights Watch: New York, 2008). <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/zimbabwe1108/>
- ³¹ “Zimbabwe Cabinet to be Sworn In.” *BBC News*. February 13, 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7887546.stm>

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- ³² Celia Dugger. "Zimbabwe Opposition Boycotts Unity Government." *New York Times*. October 16, 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/17/world/africa/17zimbabwe.html>
- ³³ Celia Dugger, "Tsvangirai Calls Off Cabinet-Meetings Boycott." *New York Times*. November 5, 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/world/africa/06zimbabwe.html?scp=1&sq=tsvangirai&st=cse>
- ³⁴ "Background Note: Zimbabwe." *U.S. Department of State*. October 2009. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5479.htm>
- ³⁵ As Bratton and Masunungure observe, "Whenever necessary, party propaganda portrays the country's situation as a permanent *chimurgenga* (armed struggle) and vilifies organized political opposition as a treasonous attempt to restore the colonial *status quo ante*." Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure. "Zimbabwe's Long Agony." *Journal of Democracy*. October 2008: Vol. 19, Num. 4. p.43.
- ³⁶ Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure. "Zimbabwe's Long Agony." *Journal of Democracy*. October 2008: Vol. 19, Num. 4. p.45.
- ³⁷ Movement for Democratic Change Party Website. http://www.mdc.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=28
- ³⁸ Dumisani Muleya. "Battle lines drawn as Zuma takes hard line on Zimbabwe." *Business Day* (South Africa). August 29, 2009.
- ³⁹ In 1997, Britain's Secretary for International Development, Clare Short, wrote a letter to Zimbabwe Agriculture Minister Kumbirai Kangai stating that "I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are new government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish, and as you know, we were colonized not colonizers." The letter infuriated Mugabe and led to a deterioration in relations between the two countries. Heidi Holland. *Dinner with Mugabe: The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter Who Became a Tyrant*. (Penguin Books: South Africa, 2008). p. 95.
- ⁴⁰ "Land Redistribution in Southern Africa." *PBS Online NewsHour*. April 14, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/land/gp_zimbabwe.html
- ⁴¹ Stuart Dornan, "Zimbabwe's Economy: A Report Card, Mid-2009". *The Brenthurst Foundation*. October 2009. http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commissioned_Reports/BD0908-Zimbabwe.pdf
- ⁴² Veronica Nmobo, "Son of the Soil: Reclaiming the Land in Zimbabwe." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. August 2008, Vol. 43(4). p.388.
- ⁴³ Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure. "Zimbabwe's Long Agony." *Journal of Democracy*. October 2008: Vol. 19, Num. 4. p.46-47.